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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Leigh Brooks Anderes appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdicts finding her guilty of felony battery on a probation and parole officer, two 
counts of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, and one count of 
possession of drug paraphernalia. Anderes claims, for the first time on appeal, 
that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument. Anderes 
also contends the district court abused its discretion in ordering restitution. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Anderes, who was on parole, reported to the probation and parole office 
to meet with her supervising officer, Elias Martinez, who informed her that he 
was going to take her into custody on an agent's warrant. (Tr., p.270, Ls.20-21, 
p.561, Ls.4-8, p.565, Ls.7-12; PSI, p.8.) At that same meeting, Officer Martinez 
found spice and paraphernalia in Anderes' purse. (Tr., p.266, L.4 - p.267, L.4, 
p.274, Ls.2-21.) Officer Martinez requested the assistance of another probation 
and parole officer, Robert Kightlinger. (Tr., p.265, L.24 - p.266, L.3.) While 
Officer Martinez went outside to get a car to transport Anderes to jail, Officer 
Kightlinger remained inside Officer Martinez's office with Anderes. (Tr., p.391, 
Ls.3-19.) At one point, Anderes started gathering her belongings and Officer 
Kightlinger "told her [to] just leave them in the chair." (Tr., p.391, L.17 - p.392, 
L.5.) Anderes put the items down but "then turned back to them and picked 
them up again." (Tr., p.392, Ls.6-11.) Officer Kightlinger again instructed her to 
"leave them." (Tr., p.392, Ls.12-13.) Anderes "stopped again," put the items 
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back down, and Officer Kightlinger "told her to turn and face the wall and put her 
hands behind her back." (Tr., p.392, Ls.15-20.) Anderes complied at first but 
then "turned, grabbed the things out of the chair, tucked them into her stomach, 
like a running back would do with a football, and turned and charged at" Officer 
Kightlinger. (Tr., p.392, L.21 - p.393, L.7.) Anderes "made contact" with Officer 
Kightlinger and the two "spun out of the doorway and into the hallway." (Tr., 
p.395, Ls.17-23.) Officer Kightlinger attempted to gain control of Anderes and 
was able to put a handcuff on her left arm. (Tr., p.396, Ls.15-23.) Anderes 
continued to fight, trying to get her arm away from Officer Kightlinger. (Tr., 
p.397, Ls.1-10.) Anderes and Officer Kightlinger continued to struggle until other 
officers came to Officer Kightlinger's aid. (Tr., p.397, L.12 - p.400, L.1.) 
Tara Richardson, a vocational rehabilitation counselor whose office is 
located in the same building as probation and parole, was the first to witness the 
altercation. (Tr., p.497, Ls.7-24.) Richardson came out of her office after she 
heard a loud thump that sounded like someone hitting the wall or the floor. (Tr., 
p.503, Ls.8-18.) Richardson saw Officer Kightlinger on the ground with Anderes 
and Anderes was "struggling to get away" while Officer Kightlinger tried to 
"restain her and put her in handcuffs." (Tr., p.504, Ls.1-7.) Anderes was kicking 
Officer Kightlinger, "thrashing around, rolling side to side, [and] talking really 
loudly." (Tr., p.504, Ls.11-16.) 
Richardson asked another probation and parole officer, Christopher 
Phillips, for assistance. (Tr., p.505, L.14 - p.506, L.14.) Officer Phillips 
responded and saw Officer Kightlinger on the ground trying to detain Anderes. 
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(Tr., p.631, Ls.14-25.) Officer Phillps "ended up helping free" Officer Kightlinger 
so they could get restraints on Anderes. {Tr., p.632, Ls.16-19.) Officer Phillips 
noted that Anderes already had a handcuff on her left wrist and he and another 
officer secured the handcuff on Anderes' right wrist. (Tr., p.632, L.20 - p.633, 
L.9.) 
When Officer Martinez came back from retrieving the car, he saw Officer 
Phillips "rounding the corner to head over to help [Officer] Kightlinger with Ms. 
Anderes" where they were "struggling on the floor." (Tr., p.649, Ls.12-20.) 
Officer Martinez "assisted Officer Phillips in getting [Anderes'] right hand cuffed, 
restrained." (Tr., p.651, Ls.5-8.) At that time, Anderes was "still struggling, 
kicking, [and] flopping," so Officer Phillips "grabbed her legs and gave her 
commands to stop resisting." (Tr., p.651, Ls.7-10.) 
Probation and parole section supervisor, Christine Barrera, who had 
collected a urinalysis from Anderes earlier that morning, responded to Officer 
Martinez' office after the incident was reported to her. (Tr., p.187, Ls.11-15, 
p.203, L.20 - p.204, L.8, p.205, L.21 - p.206, L.12.) By then, Anderes was 
handcuffed in Officer Martinez' office. (Tr., p.206, Ls.13-14.) Officer Barrera 
asked Anderes if she needed medical attention and Anderes declined but then 
"leaned forward and smacked her head on the desk twice." (Tr., p.207, L.16 -
p.208, L.10.) Officer Barrera therefore moved Anderes out into the hall where 
she was held until a Boise Police officer came and took her into custody. (Tr., 
p.208, Ls.11-17, p.284, L.1 - p.285, L.5.) 
3 
As a result of his altercation with Anderes, Officer Kightlinger sustained a 
broken finger as well as injuries to his knee and shoulder. (Tr., p.400, L.17 -
p.404, L.17.) 
The state charged Anderes with felony battery on a probation and parole 
officer, two counts of possession of a controlled substance and possession of 
paraphernalia. (R., pp.33-34, 103-104, 122, 125-127, 179-181.) The state also 
filed an Information Part II alleging Anderes is a persistent violator. (R., pp.48-
49, 134-135.) A jury found Anderes guilty of all four counts and Anderes 
admitted the persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.228-229; Tr., pp.788-791.) 
The court imposed a unified 20-year sentence with five years fixed on the felony 
battery charge and concurrent one-year jail sentences on the three possession 
counts. (R., pp.282-285.) The district court also ordered Anderes to pay 
restitution totaling $41,537.98. (R., pp.306-307.) Anderes filed timely notices of 
appeal from the judgment and restitution order. (R., pp.292-296, 310-314.) 
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ISSUES 
Anderes states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the state violate Ms. Anderes' right to a fair trial by 
committing prosecutorial misconduct? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered 
restitution for a portion of Mr. Kightlinger's surgery which 
repaired damage that was not proven to have been caused 
by Ms. Anderes and in ordering restitution for a pair of 
sunglasses that the State failed to prove were damaged or 
destroyed as a result of Ms. Anderes' criminal actions? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Anderes failed to establish fundamental error entitling her to relief on 
her unpreserved misconduct claim? 
2. Has Anderes failed to establish an abuse of the district court's discretion 




Anderes Has Failed To Show The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct During 
Closing Argument, Much Less That The Prosecutor's Argument Amounted To 
Fundamental Error 
A. Introduction 
Anderes claims, for the first time on appeal, that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct during closing argument. (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-20) Anderes' 
argument is without merit. A review of the record shows the prosecutor's closing 
argument was not improper, much less fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial." State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414,435 (2009). If a defendant fails to 
timely object at trial to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, 
the conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing 
by the defendant that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of fundamental 
error. kl at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
C. Anderes Has Failed To Show Any Error In The Prosecutor's Closing 
Argument, Much Less Fundamental Error 
Anderes claims fundamental error occurred when the prosecutor 
"repeatedly made statements during closing arguments vouching for 
prosecutorial witnesses and calling Ms. Anderes a liar." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
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Contrary to Anderes' claim, the prosecutor did not call Anderes a liar or 
improperly vouch for the state's witnesses. 
Under the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), unobjected to claims of constitutional error are 
reviewed using a three-part test: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted). Application of this test to 
the facts of this case shows Anderes has failed to carry her burden of 
demonstrating any error in the prosecutor's closing argument, let alone 
fundamental error. 
The first prong of the fundamental error test requires Anderes to 
demonstrate a constitutional violation. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
Anderes cannot satisfy the first prong because the prosecutor's comments were 
not improper. With respect to Anderes' credibility, the prosecutor stated: 
In regard to her credibility, the defendant says that she never 
went back into another room after she was in the hallway. 
Christine Barrera says, the defendant went into that office that's 
marked 18, 19 [on the diagram], that Officer Martinez was using 
that day and sat in a chair by the desk. Eli Martinez says that the 
defendant was taken into that office and placed in a chair by the 
desk. 
The defendant is not credible in that regard or in many 
others. The defendant says, when asked if she used force or 
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exerted force, worlds like that, or if she'd ever caused contact with 
Probation and Parole Officer Kightlinger, she says, no. No' I never 
did that 
Tara sees kicking, rocking, struggling. Eli Martinez sees 
kicking and struggling. Christopher Martinez sees kicking and 
struggling. Christopher Phillips sees the defendant struggling, and, 
yet, she claims that she was doing nothing at all, laying there 
passively, apparently, other than attempts to get away. 
So when you consider her credibility, you know that she's 
lied to you about how that second handcuff went on. You have 
three people. Chris Phillips can't even remember these other 
people's names. He's not going to come up here and tell you 
anything that isn't true for a bunch of people he can't even recall 
well enough to give you their name. He is very credible, and the 
others who tell you about that are as well. 
She has lied to you about being moved into that room. For 
what purpose that is, I don't know. But she wanted it to be very 
clear that she disagreed with Christine Barrera and Eli Martinez 
about being moved into that room. They are sufficiently credible 
that you can define that as not being truthful. She lies about 
kicking and struggling. There are four sets of eyes that tell you that 
she continued to struggle: Officer Kightlinger's, Tara Richardson's, 
Officer Martinez and Chris Phillips. 
We talk about a burglary conviction during her cross-
examination. She was also using controlled substances. Maybe 
some of those aren't lies. Maybe she can't remember very well 
some of these details, but she is not credible, and, again, she's the 
one who's charged with a crime here and has a lot at stake. 
(Tr., p.752, L.15- p.754, L.8.) 
While Anderes acknowledges that the prosecutor discussed the evidence 
and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in relation to Anderes' 
credibility, she nevertheless argues that the prosecutor "crossed the line by 
immediately following these proper comments with impermissible statements 
inserting her personal view of the evidence, including repeatedly offering her 
opinion that Ms. Anderes is lying." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) The entire point of 
8 
the prosecutor's closing argument is to articulate the state's view of the 
evidence, and doing so does not constitute error. State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 
18, 189 P.3d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 2008) (prosecutor has "considerable latitude in 
closing argument" and is "entitled to discuss fully . . . the evidence and the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom"). Further, it is not improper to argue that the 
defendant is lying. State v. Mendoza, 151 Idaho 623, 262 P.3d 266 (Ct. App. 
2011 ), is illustrative. 
Mendoza argued that the "prosecutor gave an 'impermissible personal 
opinion' regarding the truth or falsity of Mendoza's testimony during closing 
argument." Mendoza, 151 Idaho at 626, 262 P.3d at 269. Specifically, Mendoza 
asserted the following statement qualified as misconduct: 
[Defense counsel] is correct in that if you believe completely Miss 
Mendoza's story that she told yesterday on the stand, it does cover 
a whole lot of things. It explains a whole lot of things, but she also 
had four months to think of this story and to build this story so that 
she could, in fact, cover all of those bases. 
According to Mendoza, these comments reflected the prosecutor's opinion 
that Mendoza was lying that "interfered with the jury's ability to determine 
credibility." Mendoza, 151 Idaho at 626-627, 262 P.3d at 269-270. The Court of 
Appeals rejected Mendoza's argument, stating: 
Here, when the prosecutor made the comment about how 
Mendoza had time to think about and plan her testimony, he was 
merely assailing Mendoza's credibility. He did not inject any. 
personal opinions about Mendoza lying; he simply invited the jury 
to make an inference from the evidence presented at trial which 
included the fact that Mendoza had already admitted to lying twice 
before with regard to how she acquired the counterfeit bills. 
Mendoza has failed to demonstrate that his comment was 
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misconduct, much less that it violated her unwaived constitutional 
right to a fair trial, and therefore failed to show fundamental error. 
Mendoza, 151 Idaho at 627, 262 P.3d at 270. 
The same is true here. The prosecutor did not express her personal 
opinion, but "invited the jury to make an inference from the evidence presented 
at trial" that demonstrated Anderes was lying. It is apparent from the context of 
the prosecutor's statements regarding Anderes' credibility that this is precisely 
what she was doing; such argument is entirely proper. Mendoza, 151 Idaho at 
626, 262 P.3d at 269 ("Statements are not misconduct when it is apparent form 
the context in which the challenged statements were made that the prosecutor 
was analyzing the evidence and stating the conclusion that he urged the jury to 
draw from the evidence."). 
As for Anderes' assertion that the prosecutor called her a "liar," this claim 
is unsupported by the record. While the prosecutor urged the jury to conclude 
Anderes was lying, she did not resort to name-calling and refer to Anderes as a 
liar. Compare State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 18-19, 189 P.3d 477, 480-481 (Ct. 
App. 2008) ("excessive labeling of the defendant as a 'liar' could be viewed as an 
improper attempt to obtain a finding of guilt by disparaging the defendant before 
the jury," but "[i]t is not misconduct, however, to refer to the defendant as a liar if 
the defendant admitted to lying in connection with the case"). Any argument to 
the contrary is belied by the record. 
Anderes also contends the prosecutor improperly vouched for the state's 
witnesses during closing argument. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14.) Specifically, 
Anderes points to the prosecutor's comments above that the state's witnesses 
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were credible and to fragments from the following comments regarding the 
credibility of Officer Kightlinger: 
So is Robert Kightlinger credible? Absolutely. You've got 
corroboration for many of the things that he says. He's the only set 
of eyes on her for some of the other things that he points out, but 
he is credible. He is corroborated by many details. The manner in 
which he testified was very credible. He was steady and calm up 
there, just like Tara says that he was during this incident, when he 
was calmly saying, please, stop resisting. Tara Richardson said 
that he was calm and steady that day as well. 
His non-verbals were very credible. We talked about that in 
voir dire. His version of events makes sense. There's logic that 
supports it as well, and he has no motive to be untruthful. He has 
no bias. He's never even known her before that day, so for what 
possible reason would there be for him to make up this story? Very 
credible. 
Now, if you believe Eli Martinez, Tara Richardson and Chris 
Phillips, you can convict the defendant even if you didn't believe 
Robert Kightlinger. They see enough, they hear enough, they 
know enough, really, to substantiate this charge even if you didn't 
have Officer Kightlinger's testimony, but you do and he is a credible 
witness. They see her kicking and struggling and in a violent and 
forceful way. 
(Tr., p.755, L.12-p.756, L.11.) 
In addition to highlighting portions of the foregoing statements made by 
the prosecutor, Anderes contends the "prosecution theme of vouching continued 
in rebuttal closing," citing the following comments (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14): 
[Defense counsel] is a gifted storyteller, the likes of Mark 
Twain. Unfortunately, in this context, the story is only helpful if it's 
based on accurate facts, and he bases his on Ms. Anderes' 
version, which is not credible and not what happened. 
(Tr., p.774, Ls.15-19.) 
And, ultimately, counsel talks about the credibility of 
probation and parole officers. He tries to imply that this isn't how it 
happened; that Ms. Anderes' version is accurate. Why, if you are a 
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professional probation and parole officer would you want to admit 
that you got beat up by her, instead of saying you fell down at 
work? What bias does he have to make this up? What motive 
does he have to say she did this? None. The only reason he has 
to get up there and tell you that this happened is because it's the 
truth. He swore to tell the truth and he did. And, like it or not, that 
is how it happened. 
(Tr., p.776, L.20 - p.777, L.6.) 
Now, counsel implies that Eli Martinez came in today and 
talked about moving Ms. Anderes into that office, apparently, as a 
fabrication to backup what Ms. Barrera said. If Eli Martinez was 
willing to come in here and tell you a lie, wouldn't he have just told 
you that he saw her pounding her head on the desk too? He tells 
you that he had limited access with her when she's in that room 
because he went off to go make phone calls to get police and 
paramedics there. If this was going to be some, you know, cloaks 
and daggers thing, where people are coming in her [sic] and telling 
you things that aren't true, why does he happen to not be there 
when she pounds her head on the desk? Because he just didn't 
happen to be there. That's the truth. And he did not come in here 
and say something that wasn't true about that because there's no 
motive. Again, what would he get out of it? Who has a motive to 
be less than truthful and who has other markers of poor credibility? 
The defendant. 
(Tr., p.778, L.20 - p.779, L.13.) 
The prosecutor's comments regarding the credibility of the state's 
witnesses did not constitute improper vouching. A prosecutor may "express an 
opinion in argument as to the truth or falsity of testimony ... when such an 
opinion is based upon the evidence." State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 288, 
178 P .3d 644, 653 (Ct. App. 2007); see also State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 
P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1996) (While a prosecutor may not "express a personal 
belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence," a 
prosecutor may "express how, from [the prosecutor's] perspective, the evidence 
confirms or calls into doubt the credibility of particular witnesses."). A prosecutor 
12 
may also argue "that the state's evidence and theory of the case [is] more 
convincing." State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20, 189 P.3d 477, 482 (Ct. App. 
2008). A prosecutor's opinions and argument do not constitute vouching unless 
the prosecutor interjects "personal belief' regarding the evidence or a witness's 
credibility, Timmons, 145 Idaho at 289, 178 P.3d at 654, or asks jurors "to make 
their decision based upon . . . the prosecutor's self-proclaimed moral rectitude 
and integrity rather than addressing the evidence," Gross, 146 Idaho at 20, 189 
P.3d at 482. 
The prosecutor in this case did not frame her comments in terms of 
personal belief or opinion; she detailed the evidence supporting the witnesses' 
testimony and the state's view of the evidence. In fact, the prosecutor's entire 
discussion regarding the comparative credibility of the witnesses was preceded 
by reference to the jury instruction that tells the jury "the weight to be given to 
certain evidence" is for the jury to decide. (Tr., p.751, Ls.12-15.) It was entirely 
proper for the prosecutor to discuss that jury instruction in relation to the 
evidence presented at trial and the jury's task of deciding which version of events 
was true. State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685, 227 P.3d 933, 939 (Ct. App. 
2010) (closing argument properly includes the opportunity "to discuss the law set 
forth in the jury instructions as it applies to the trial evidence"). Anderes' claim to 
the contrary is without merit. 
The second element of a claim of fundamental error is that the alleged 
error is "clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not 
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure 
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to object was a tactical decision." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 
(footnote omitted). Anderes cannot satisfy this element because she cannot 
show from the appellate record any error, much less error that is "clear or 
obvious." Nor has she demonstrated that the failure to object to the prosecutor's 
argument was anything but a tactical decision. Anderes' argument otherwise 
centers around her assertion that it "cannot be a tactical decision" to fail to object 
to vouching and "disparag[ing]" the defendant's veracity. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.17.) The most obvious reason counsel did not object to the prosecutor's 
closing argument is that the prosecutor's statements were not improper. Beyond 
that, it is well within counsel's tactical decision-making authority to decline to 
object in instances where he may believe the prosecutor is disparaging his client 
or vouching for the state's witnesses. See United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 
1167, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999) ( counsel's decision not to object to the prosecutor's 
closing argument "falls within the range of permissible conduct of trial counsel"). 
For example, a defense attorney may wish to use the prosecutor's statements 
against her or to use the same strategy in his own closing argument. In this 
case, defense counsel, like the prosecutor, focused his closing argument on the 
believability of the defense's version of events as compared to the state's version 
or, as defense counsel characterized it, the "logic" and 
"common sense" of Anderes' story compared to the illogic of the state's story. 
(See generally Tr., pp.760-774.) 
Anderes' claim that "[t]he record in this case suggests no reason to 
conclude that defense counsel elected, as a matter of trial strategy, to waive any 
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objection" to the prosecutor's closing argument is conclusory and fails to satisfy 
her burden of showing clear error. 
The final element of a claim of fundamental error requires Anderes to 
"demonstrate that the error affected [her] substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Even if Anderes could overcome the 
first two prongs of the fundamental error analysis, she has not and cannot show 
the error affected her substantial rights. Anderes claims otherwise, arguing that 
the "prosecutorial misconduct requires vacation of the conviction because it 
cannot be said that it did not affect the outcome of the trial" because, she claims, 
the "prosecution unabashedly referred to Ms. Anderes as a liar and encouraged 
the jury to find only its witnesses credible based upon the prosecutor's personal 
belief, not just upon the evidence and inferences there from [sic]" and 
"encouraged the jury to disregard their [sic] exclusive role as the judges of 
credibility in favor of the prosecutor's beliefs regarding credibility." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.17.) Beyond the fact that the record belies Anderes' claim that the 
prosecutor called Anderes a "liar" or "encouraged" the jury to find Anderes guilty 
based on the prosecutor's "beliefs," there was overwhelming evidence of 
Anderes' guilt, including Anderes' own admissions regarding her conduct. 
The primary relevant difference between the version of events Anderes 
testified to at trial and the version the state's witnesses testified to is that 
Anderes claimed that Officer Kightlinger grabbed her when she attempted to 
escape whereas Officer Kightlinger's testimony was that Anderes sprinted into 
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him and knocked him into the hallway. (Compare Tr., pp.393-396 with Tr., 
pp.574-578.) While it is true, as Anderes claims, that this case "hinge[d] on 
credibility" (Appellant's Brief, p.17), the evidence was overwhelming that 
Anderes' version of events was untrue. As noted by the prosecutor, "if you 
believe Eli Martinez, Tara Richardson and Chris Phillips, you can convict 
[Anderes] even if you didn't believe Robert Kightlinger." (Tr., p.756, Ls.4-6.) 
Those witnesses saw and heard "enough" to "substantiate th[e battery] charge 
even if you didn't have Officer Kightlinger's testimony" as those other witnesses 
saw Anderes "kicking and struggling in a violent and forceful way." (Tr., p.756, 
Ls.4-11.) 
Further, Anderes' claim that the jury convicted her based on the 
prosecutor's argument rather than the evidence would require this Court to 
conclude that the jury ignored the following jury instruction: 
As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence 
you believe and what weight you attach to it. There is no magical 
formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You bring with you 
to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your 
lives. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom 
you believe, what you believe and how much weight you attach to 
what you're told. The same considerations that you use in your 
everyday dealings in making these decisions are the considerations 
which you should apply in these deliberations. 
In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision 
simply because more witnesses may have testified one way than 
the other. Your role is to think about the testimony of each witness 
you heard and decide how much you believe of what the witness 
has said. 
(Tr., p.176, Ls.5-20.) The jury would have also had to have ignored the court's 
instruction, given no less than four times, that the parties' arguments did not 
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constitute evidence. (Trial Tr., p.170, Ls.20-24 (closing arguments are not 
evidence), p.724, Ls.5-10 (same), p.737, Ls.17-18 (same), p.761, Ls.10-15 
(same).). The presumption, however, is exactly opposite as "Idaho appellate 
courts also presume that a jury follows the instructions it is given." State v. Joy, 
155 Idaho 1, 7, 304 P.3d 276, 282 (2013) (citation omitted). Anderes has failed 
to demonstrate that her substantial rights were affected by the alleged 
misconduct she claims for the first time on appeal. Anderes has, therefore, 
failed to satisfy the final element of the Perry fundamental error analysis. 
Anderes next argues that, even if each of the instances of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct did not amount individually to reversible error, "the 
accumulation of the errors and irregularities that took place negated her right to a 
fair trial and, thus, mandate reversal and a new trial" under the doctrine of 
cumulative error. (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-20.) Anderes' cumulative argument 
error fails because the cumulative error analysis does not include errors neither 
objected to nor found fundamental. Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982. 
Because Anderes did not object to any of the alleged misconduct and because 
none of the prosecutor's statements amounted to fundamental error, there is no 
error to cumulate. 1 
1 In the Introduction section of her misconduct argument, Anderes relies on both 
the state and federal constitutions to support her claim of error. (Appellant's 
Brief, p.6.) However, Anderes "does not give any explanation as to why the 
Idaho Constitution should be interpreted as providing any greater protection than 
its federal counterpart." Mendoza, 151 Idaho at 626 n.1, 262 P.3d at 269 n.1. 




Anderes Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Ordering Her To Pay Restitution For The Full Economic Losses That Were 
Actually And Proximately Caused By Anderes' Criminal Conduct 
A. Introduction 
The district court ordered Anderes to pay restitution in the amount of 
$41,537.98. That restitution order was broken down as follows: (1) $861.82 to 
Officer Kightlinger; (2) $40,576.16 to the State Insurance Fund; and (3) $100.00 
to the Drug Enforcement Donation Account. (R., p.307.) Anderes "does not 
challenge the majority of the restitution ordered," but claims "that a portion of 
[Officer] Kightlinger's shoulder surgery was completed to address arthritis issues 
including calcification and bone spurring," and should not have been included 
because it was not the result of Anderes' battery on him. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.22.) Anderes also challenges the inclusion of $180 ordered as restitution for 
the loss of Officer Kightlinger's sunglasses. (Appellant's Brief, pp.25-26.) A 
review of the record and the applicable law supports the district court's award of 
restitution for the entire cost of Officer Kightlinger's surgery and his sunglasses. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed 
to the trial court's discretion. State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 211, 296 P.3d 412, 
417 (Ct. App. 2013). The trial court's factual findings in relation to restitution will 
not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 
882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013); State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 
P.3d 398, 401 (2011). 
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C. Substantial Evidence Supports The District Court's Total Restitution 
Award 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) authorizes a court to "order a defendant found 
guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make 
restitution to the victim." For purposes of Idaho's restitution statute, a "victim" 
includes any "person or entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result 
of the defendant's criminal conduct." I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(i) (emphasis added). 
"Economic loss" includes, among other things, "the value of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed ... and ... medical expenses resulting 
from the criminal conduct." I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a) (emphasis added). "Therefore, 
in order for restitution to be appropriate, there must be a causal connection 
between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the injuries 
suffered by the victim." Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401. 
As recently reiterated by the Idaho Supreme Court, "causation consists of 
actual cause and true proximate cause." Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 
401 (citing State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374, 223 P.3d 750, 757 (2009)). 
The Court articulated the distinction between actual and proximate cause as 
follows: 
"Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular 
event produced a particular consequence. [Lampien, 148 Idaho at 
374, 223 P.3d at 757] (quoting [Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 
875, 204 P.3d 508, 515 (2009)]). The "but for" test is used in 
circumstances where there is only one actual cause or where two 
or more possible causes were not acting concurrently. kl On the 
other hand, true proximate cause deals with "whether it was 
reasonably foreseeable that such harm would flow from the 
negligent conduct." kl (quoting Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 204 
P.3d at 515). In analyzing proximate cause, this Court must 
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determine whether the injury and manner of occurrence are so 
highly unusual "that a reasonable person, making an inventory of 
the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would 
not have reasonably expected the injury to occur." kl (quoting 
Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875,204 P.3d at 515). 
Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401. The determinations of actual cause 
and proximate cause are both factual questions. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 
P.3d at 401. 
Applying the two-part causation inquiry to the facts before it, the Court in 
Corbus upheld an award of restitution for injuries sustained by the victim when 
he jumped out of Corbus' vehicle in the course of a police chase. 150 Idaho at 
602-06, 401-05. Regarding actual cause, the Court found that, but for "Corbus' 
acts of driving recklessly and eluding police officers and then failing to stop in 
response to their overhead emergency lights," the victim "would not have needed 
to" jump from the vehicle. Id. at 603, 249 P.3d at 402. The Court also found 
proximate cause existed because, based on the evidence that showed "Corbus 
had created an extremely dangerous situation for his passenger by driving at 
night, at excessive speeds, with no headlights on ... , it was reasonably 
foreseeable that his passenger would decide to jump from the vehicle to avoid a 
potentially serious car accident." Id. at 605, 249 P.3d at 404. 
More recently, in State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 390-394, 271 P.3d 
1243, 1246-1250 (Ct. App. 2012), the Idaho Court of Appeals upheld an award 
of restitution to the police officer victim for a knee injury he sustained when he 
attempted to restrain Cottrell while Cottrell actively resisted and obstructed the 
officer's attempt to arrest him. The Court concluded that actual cause was 
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"satisfied because the evidence show[ed] it was Cottrell's acts of attempting to 
pull away from [the officer] during arrest that precipitated the need for [the officer] 
to gain control of Cottrell and, in so doing, twist his knee." & at 393, 271 P.3d at 
1249 (footnote omitted). The Court also found proximate cause, reasoning it 
was reasonably foreseeable, based on Cottrell's repeated failures to obey the 
officer's requests and submit to arrest, "that Cottrell's conduct would elicit a 
physical response from [the officer], putting [the officer] in a position to injure his 
knee." & 
As in Corbus and Cottrell, a review of the evidence in this case supports 
the district court's award of restitution and, more specifically, its finding that the 
"the treatment received in the medical records that were submitted to the State 
Insurance Fund and paid by the State Insurance Fund was necessary medical 
treatment that resulted from the defendant's criminal conduct." (Tr., p.823, Ls.6-
11.) The records to which the district court referred show that, on May 10, 2013, 
four days after Anderes battered Officer Kightlinger, Officer Kightlinger went to 
see Dr. Gregory Schweiger at Orthopedic Associates. (PSI, p.82.2) Dr. 
Schweiger's progress notes reflect that Officer Kightlinger was being seen as a 
result of injuries sustained during an "altercation with an inmate on May 6, 2013." 
2 At the restitution hearing, the prosecutor asked the court to take judicial notice 
of Officer Kightlinger's medical records, which are included as attachments to the 
presentence investigation report. (Tr., p.802, L.19 - p.803, L.2.) Specifically, 
the prosecutor referred to documents with the handwritten page numbers 
ranging from 52 to 68. (Tr., p.803, Ls.8-13.) These pages can be found at 
pages 74 to 90 of the electronic file AnderesPSl.pdf. Anderes stipulated to 
admission of those documents. (Tr., p.804, Ls.18-19.) All references to those 
documents in this brief will be to the corresponding page numbers of the 
electronic file. 
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(PSI, p.82.) Those injuries included Officer Kightlinger's right knee. (PSI, p.60.) 
Officer Kightlinger saw Dr. Schweiger again on May 24, 2013. (PSI, p.80.) Dr. 
Schweiger's notes from that visit indicate that Officer Kightlinger was still 
experiencing pain in his right shoulder. (PSI, p.80.) Dr. Schweiger ordered x-
rays of Officer Kightlinger's shoulder on June 5, 2013, and noted that Officer 
Kightlinger had a "prominent bone on the acromial and clavicular aspects where 
there have been chronic calsifications from previous injuries," but noted Officer 
Kightlinger did not "report any previous injuries to his right acromioclavicular 
joint." (PSI, p.78.) 
Dr. Jared Tadje, also with Orthopaedic Associates, saw Officer Kightlinger 
on June 17, 2013. (PSI, p.76.) Dr. Tadje's notes reflect that Officer Kightlinger 
began experiencing "right shoulder pain which started on May 6, 2013 when he 
was fighting with a suspect and had the immediate onset of pain during the 
altercation. Afterwards he had a significant amount of popping and a grinding 
feeling in his shoulder." (PSI, p.76.) An MRI showed Officer Kightlinger had "a 
labral tear" and "impingement." (PSI, p.76.) Dr. Tadje performed surgery on 
Officer Kightlinger's shoulder on July 9, 2013. (See PSI, pp.86-88.) In his 
Operative Report, Dr. Tadje noted Officer Kightlinger had "extensive labral 
tearing all the way from his posterior labrum to involving his anterior labrum," 
which Dr. Tadje repaired. (PSI, pp.86-87.) The report further reflects that Officer 
Kightlinger had "significant bone spurring and narrowing of the AC joint." (PSI, 
p.87.) Dr. Tadje "removed the distal portion of the clavicle," and "used a shaver 
to remove the excess bursa! tissue so [he] could extensively examine the bursa! 
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portion of the rotator cuff' to determine if there was "evidence of tearing of the 
rotator cuff." (PSI, p.65.) The diagnoses listed on Dr. Tadje's Operative Report 
are: "1) Right shoulder labral tear. 2) Right shoulder impingement. 3) Right AC 
joint arthritis." (PSI, p.86.) 
Anderes argues "the State failed to prove that her criminal actions were 
the cause of [Officer] Kightlinger's arthritis, bone spurring, or the calsfication of 
his AC joint" and contends "it is reasonable to believe, based upon common logic 
and the medical reports, that [Officer] Kightlinger did not develop arthritis 
overnight as a result of the alleged battery." (Appellant's Brief, p.24.) According 
to Anderes, "ordering her to pay restitution to correct or alleviate arthritis related 
issues is akin to ordering an individual to pay for the cancer treatment of a victim 
whose cancer is discovered in the process of treatment for an injury cased [sic] 
in a criminal act." (Appellant's Brief, p.24.) This argument is legally and factually 
without merit. 
The record clearly establishes that Officer Kightlinger was not 
experiencing pain in his right shoulder until Anderes battered him. The shoulder 
surgery performed by Dr. Tandje was to treat that injury. That Dr. Tandje 
discovered arthritis in Officer Kightlinger's shoulder while he repaired the labral 
tear and examined the rotator cuff does not qualify as treatment for arthritis. 
Anderes' claim otherwise is unsupported by fact and her contention that she is 
not responsible for the shoulder surgery caused by her criminal conduct is 
contrary to law. 
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Anderes next contends the district court erred in awarding restitution for 
Officer Kightlinger's sunglasses, claiming the "State failed to present sufficient 
evidence that Mr. Kightlinger's sunglasses were damaged or destroyed during 
the alleged [sic] battery." This argument also fails. 
At the restitution hearing, the following evidence was presented in relation 
to Officer Kightlinger's sunglasses: 
Q. And, then, in addition to costs associated with your travel, did 
you also have a financial loss based on the loss of a pair of Oakley 
sunglasses? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you know the market cost of those sunglasses when 
they were damaged? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was that? 
A. I think it was $180. 
(Tr., p.816, L.20- p.817, L.3.) 
The district court found that the "injury to the sunglasses of $180 has 
been proven by a preponderance of the evidence." (Tr., p.824, Ls.21-23.) 
Anderes challenges this finding on several bases. First, she claims that although 
the "questioning implied that Officer Kightlinger lost a pair of sunglasses," the 
prosecutor did not ask how or when they were lost." (Appellant's Brief, p.26.) 
This is incorrect. The prosecutor's questions regarding Officer Kightlinger's 
sunglasses was preceded by questioning that established the losses about 
which Officer Kightlinger would be testifying related to the May 6, 2013 incident 
with Anderes. (Tr., p.815, Ls.2-13.) 
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Second, Anderes complains that it is "unclear if the sunglasses were 
destroyed or lost because the State failed to examine [Officer] Kightlinger on the 
issue." (Appellant's Brief, p.26.) This is also incorrect. The prosecutor asked 
about the "loss" of Officer Kightlinger's sunglasses as a result of them being 
damaged. (Tr., p.816, Ls.20-25.) Her question did not imply that Officer 
Kightlinger "lost" the sunglasses nor create any confusion on whether the 
sunglasses were "destroyed or lost." The loss the prosecutor was establishing 
was the economic loss resulting from the damage to the sunglasses. Anderes' 
claim that the prosecutor's questions on this topic were somehow incomplete 
fails. 
Third, Anderes contends that "the State did not present any evidence that 
the sunglasses were lost or damaged as a result of Ms. Anderes' actions." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.26.) This argument is not meaningfully different than 
Anderes' claim that the state "did not ask how or when they were lost," therefore, 
it fails for the same reason. 
Finally, Anderes asserts the "State failed to present sufficient evidence 
regarding the cost of the sunglasses" because, she argues, Officer Kightlinger's 
"non-committal answer that he thought it was about $180 is insufficient to prove 
the cost." (Appellant's Brief, p.26.) Anderes cites no authority in support of this 
proposition. Officer Kightlinger's testimony regarding the cost of his glasses was 
substantial and competent evidence to support that aspect of the restitution 
award, and his assertion was undisputed at the hearing. (See Tr., p.817, Ls.6-7 
(no questions asked on cross-examination).) 
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Anderes has failed to show the district court erred in finding that Anderes' 
medical expenses could be awarded as restitution because they related to 
injuries caused by Anderes' criminal conduct or in finding that there was 
sufficient evidence to award restitution for Officer Kightlinger's sunglasses. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and 
sentences entered upon the jury verdicts finding Anderes guilty of felony battery 
on a probation and parole officer, two misdemeanor counts of possessing a 
controlled substance, and one count of possession of paraphernalia. 
DATED this 1yth day of November 2014. 
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